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Abstract An apparent paradox in household wealth accumulation in the
United States is the relatively small holding of ﬁnancial assets
and the large holding of housing wealth. To explain the high
concentration of household wealth in housing, this paper
estimates the marginal propensity to consume from housing and
from ﬁnancial assets. A higher marginal propensity to consume
from housing rather than from ﬁnancial assets would lead
households to concentrate their wealth in real estate. For
aggregate U.S. quarterly data from 1952:1 to 2002:2, the
marginal propensity to consume from housing is higher than that
from ﬁnancial wealth. These conditions provide a rationale for
the concentration of household assets in housing.
Introduction
An empirical observation about households in the United States is that they
concentrate their wealth holding in housing and hold relatively limited ﬁnancial
assets. The Federal Reserve’s 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances reveals that
65.6% of net wealth of the median household is in single-family residential
housing. By comparison, outside of retirement and insurance accounts, average
U.S. household ﬁnancial wealth in cash, bonds and mutual funds was 22.5% of
household wealth in 2001. Further, homeowners hold most ﬁnancial wealth, with
renters relatively liquidity-constrained.
This paper develops a model of consumption to determine why households hold
relatively so much of their wealth in housing. Households have a choice between
holding illiquid assets such as housing and ﬁnancial assets in restricted pension
accounts or in unrestricted liquid accounts. If households have a relatively high
marginal propensity to consume from housing as compared with ﬁnancial assets,
they will accumulate housing assets. The marginal propensity to consume depends
on risk preferences, time horizons and long-term interest rates. For aggregate U.S.
quarterly data from 1952:1 to 2002:2, the marginal propensity to consume from
housing is higher than that from ﬁnancial wealth. These conditions provide a
rationale for the concentration of household assets in housing.330  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
Households choose between physical assets such as housing or other real estate
and ﬁnancial assets such as stocks and bonds. Fratantoni (1998) and Kullmann
and Siegel (2002) note the concentration of household portfolios in housing.
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) explain the choice as one between selecting the
housing asset that is optimal in the household investment portfolio and the housing
asset that provides the optimal amount of housing services. For younger
households, this choice leads to an over-allocation in housing. A portfolio with
real estate completes the household’s utility-maximization given Euler equations
for the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). Flavin and Yamashita
(2002) examine the portfolio composition of the household in a life-cycle context
argue that the indivisibility of housing causes its overweighting in portfolios of
younger households.
The following section presents the model and theoretical structure for the
representative household. The model’s parameters are consistent with the
consumption model of Hall (1988) and Hansen and Singleton (1983) adjusted for
a representative household with the typical portfolio of housing and a retirement
account. Since these assets are not identical, there are corresponding potentially
different marginal propensities to consume from either real estate or ﬁnancial
wealth. Each marginal propensity depends on the household’s optimization of
consumption from wealth and on parameters that represent the economic
environment. The environment includes the long-term rate of interest, the
coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion and the planning horizon.
A subsequent section presents the data and estimating equation, while the ﬁnal
section discusses the empirical results for the U.S. using aggregate quarterly
consumption data for 1952:1–2002:2. These estimates show a marginal propensity
to consume from an additional dollar of housing wealth to range between 0.15
and 0.2. The marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth is between 15
and 20 cents on the dollar in a year. These results are consistent with Case,
Quigley and Shiller (2001) and other researchers who use comparable measures,
namely time series and aggregate consumption data as opposed to retail sales as
a measure of consumption.1 Using international data, they utilize aggregate
consumption as the dependent variable and ﬁnd that the added consumption from
$1 more of real estate wealth ranges between 11 and 17 cents in a year. The
second ﬁnding in the current study is that the marginal propensity to consume
from ﬁnancial wealth falls between 2 and 3 cents on the dollar per year. By
comparison, Case, Quigley and Shiller ﬁnd for their international sample a
marginal propensity to consume from ﬁnancial wealth of between zero and 2 cents
on the dollar per year. In other words, the data and results using U.S. aggregate
consumption in the current study are very similar to Case, Quigley and Shilller’s
international results for fourteen countries. Those results are also for aggregate
consumption and with time series data.
The higher marginal propensity to consume from housing is linked to a lower
required return given risk preferences, household time horizon and long-term
interest rates. Consequently, households have an incentive to concentrate onWhy Households Concentrate Wealth in Housing  331
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Vehicles 15.5 3.4 19.6 3.1 6.8 10.8
Primary residence 122.4 27.2 180.8 28.5 0.0 0.0
Mortgage loan 62.1 n.a. 91.7 n.a. 0.0 n.a.
Equity in primary residence 60.3 n.a. 89.1 n.a. 0.0 n.a.
Other residential 21.1 4.7 28.6 4.5 5.3 8.4
Nonresidential real estate 21.4 4.8 30.7 4.8 2.0 3.2
Bus. equity 76.5 17.0 108.4 17.1 9.7 15.2
Other 4.3 1.0 5.5 0.9 1.7 2.7
Total nonﬁnancial assets 261.2 58.0 373.6 58.9 25.6 40.3
Cash 28.8 6.4 38.7 6.1 8.1 12.8
Bonds 8.6 1.9 12.5 2.0 0.5 0.7
Stocks 40.9 9.1 56.6 8.9 8.1 12.7
Mutual funds 23.1 5.1 32.5 5.1 3.5 5.5
Retirement accts. 53.6 11.9 74.7 11.8 9.3 14.6
Life insurance 10.1 2.2 13.2 2.1 3.7 5.7
Other managed 20.1 4.5 28.4 4.5 2.7 4.2
Other 3.6 0.8 4.3 0.7 2.1 3.4
Total ﬁnancial assets 188.8 42.0 260.8 41.1 37.9 59.7
Total assets 450.0 100.0 634.4 100.0 63.5 100.0
Percentage of all households n.a. 100.0 n.a. 67.7 n.a. 32.3
Ave. household income 68.0 n.a. 85.1 n.a. 32.2 n.a.
Ave. household net worth 433.4 n.a. 558.2 n.a. 171.7 n.a.
Note: Data tabulated by the authors from data presented in Aizcorbe, Kennickell and Moore
(2003).
housing despite its illiquidity and apart from any tax beneﬁts capitalized in
housing prices.
 A Model of Wealth and Consumption for the Household
In the model, a representative household behaves according to the intertemporal
CCAPM in that it maximizes utility of consumption in each period over a planning
horizon. Utility of consumption is intertemporally separable, but aggregated with
a real discount rate over the planning horizon. Each period’s consumption is
constrained by wealth plus income, including a return to the wealth. Wealth is
held in housing and ﬁnancial forms, and representative data for the U.S. are in
Exhibit 1. Income is generated from the household’s human capital as wages and
salaries. Once the utility function is speciﬁed with constant relative risk aversion,332  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
the resulting consumption function depends on ﬁnancial and housing wealth and
a series of parameters that are exogenously determined by the economic
environment.
That environment generates a long-term interest rate, a planning horizon and the
speciﬁcation of a representative household’s preferences including attitude toward
risk. These three environmental parameters, together with the estimated marginal
propensities to consume from housing and ﬁnancial assets, yield implicit returns
and discount rates to holding each type of asset.
The household holds its total wealth Wt in three categories: human capital,
physical assets principally in single-family housing, and ﬁnancial assets. While
human capital is not observable, its return is earned labor income. Labor income
is included in observable personal disposable income Yt. The other source of
income for the household outside of physical or ﬁnancial assets is from transfer
payments Gt, also included in personal disposable income. Labor income is Yt 
Gt. The value of human capital is b(Yt  Gt), where b is the inverse of the rate
of return. This value of human capital is part of the household’s wealth.
The household has physical wealth in housing and other consumer durable equity
of: Ht  At  Mt. Here At is the value of the house and other assets, and Mt is
the market value of the mortgage and other debt. Holding of ﬁnancial assets such
as stocks, bonds and mutual funds is St.
One measure of the household’s total wealth Wt is to add the human capital,
housing and physical assets as well as ﬁnancial assets together as a simple sum.
These three assets, however, differ in liquidity and other characteristics.2 The
inverse rate of return b reﬂects the inability of households to sell their human
capital. Second, houses have transaction costs of brokerage, escrow and taxes that
limit sale. Real estate comes in large indivisible sizes, at least for home ownership.
Third, ﬁnancial assets held in pension or retirement accounts have prohibitions
and tax penalties on withdrawal. There are restrictions on borrowing against or
collateralizing such accounts. Consequently, there are liquidity adjustments H 
1 and S  1 on the holdings of housing and on ﬁnancial assets that create cash-
equivalent values: HHt and SSt. These adjustments lead to the household’s total
wealth of
W  b[Y  G]   H   S. (1) tt t H t S t
Wealth is a liquidity-adjusted sum of human capital, physical assets in housing
and ﬁnancial assets. That wealth enters the maximization decision of the
household, representative of the economy. The household obeys the consumption
capital asset pricing model. Consumption of the household at time t is Ct. Utility
for the representative household Ut exhibits constant relative risk aversion in
consumption with parameter  or:Why Households Concentrate Wealth in Housing  333
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1 Ct U    0. (2) t 1  
The household consumes from its wealth Wt, which includes its labor income
valued as human capital equity, its housing equity and its ﬁnancial equity. The




0    1, where  is the discount rate and  is the time horizon.
Consumption is linear in wealth with marginal propensity to consume , or:
C  W. (3) tt
From iterated expectations on the utility function, the marginal propensity to
consume from wealth is:
1  
  , (4) t 1  
where   t is the planning horizon and with weighting factor:
1
 11  
  . (5)  1   1  
The marginal propensity to consume from the three types of wealth is (,,, 
t). Here  is the real rate of interest,  the risk premium,  the coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion and   t the planning horizon. The aggregate environment
provides the real rate of interest , the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion  and
its inverse, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the planning horizon
  t. Given this environment (,,  t) common to all assets, there is a unique
risk premium  that corresponds to the  for each asset.
For housing wealth, the marginal propensity to consume adjusted for its lack of
liquidity is H. This marginal propensity can be tested as being equal to the
analogous marginal propensity to consume from ﬁnancial equity S.334  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
Substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3) and using the wealth deﬁnition gives:
1  
C  W  [b(Y  G)   S   H]  tt t t S t H t 	t 1  
 [Y*   S   H], (6) tS t H t
and  b(Yt  Gt). The consumption and savings ratios are ct  st 
CS tt Y*, t Y* Y* tt
as proportions of income. The ratio of the house asset to income is ht  Then
Ht.
Y* t
c     s   h tS t H t
1   1  
         (7)   sS S HS H t t 1   1  
is the nonlinear estimating equation. Given the invariance property of maximum
likelihood estimates of for a given environment of  t, on the long ˆˆ  ,( ,  ) i
rate, horizon and coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, the risk premium for a given
asset is solved from a rearrangement of Equations (4), (5) and (7). This structure
yields:
1 t ˆˆ ˆˆ   1      1   i  S,H ii i i i  1  (1  ) i
(8)
The equation on the right is a quadratic that solves for the weighting factor i as
in Equation (5) for each asset.
The rate of taxation on the return to asset i is 	i. For housing, imputed rental
income is not taxed in the U.S. Capital gains can be deferred by rolling over into
a replacement house or cashed out altogether (by mortgage reﬁnancing) for nearly
all homeowners without taxation.3 For ﬁnancial assets outside of protected
accounts, the income return is taxed; but, in contrast, capital gains can be deferred
by not selling.4 In retirement and pension accounts, neither the income nor capital
gains are taxed.Why Households Concentrate Wealth in Housing  335
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Estimation of Equation (7) permits a test for whether the marginal propensity to
consume from housing and ﬁnancial assets is the same and allows estimation of
the implicit return to each asset given the economic environment.
 Data and Specification of the Estimating Equation
The data are quarterly observations from 1952:1–2002:2 on aggregate
consumption, income and wealth for the U.S.5 There are two alternative deﬁnitions
of income. One is personal disposable income. The other is human capital income.
Following Davis and Palumbo (2001), human capital income is personal
disposable income less property income. Property income items representing
corporate dividends, net interest, rental income and proprietors’ income are
subtracted from total disposable income. Data on the various components of
disposable personal income and consumption are taken from the quarterly
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) of the Bureau of Economic
Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Data on real estate equity and ﬁnancial equity are from the Flow of Funds
Accounts of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Financial
wealth is total net worth minus net real estate wealth. Net real estate equity is
real estate wealth less mortgage debt. Exhibit 2 plots the relationship between the
consumption–income ratio and the real estate wealth-income ratio.336  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
To determine the time-series speciﬁcation, tests for unit roots and cointegration
are carried out. Unit root and cointegration tests are in Exhibit 3. Statistically
signiﬁcant results at the 1% level are in boldface type. The test results with
consumption, income and wealth measured relative to personal disposable income
are reported on the left, and those relative to human capital income on the right.
Test statistics including a time trend are v1 and without a time trend are v2. The
data for all time series in zt exhibit unit roots in levels. In the ﬁrst differences, all
time series are stationary. Non-stationary series are cointegrated if there is a
stationary linear combination of the variables. Both for the eigenvalue test in
Johansen (1995) and for the unit root test of Engle and Granger (1987) there is
no cointegration.
Given the unit roots in levels but stationarity in ﬁrst differences with no
cointegration and following Equation (7), the estimating equation lagging the
independent variables is:

c    
 h  
 s . (9) tH t 1 st 1
Initial estimates of Equation (7) reveal the possible presence of autocorrelation.
To correct for the autocorrelation of residuals, ARMA terms AR(L)u pt ol a gL
are included in the regression models. Serial correlation is tested using the
Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis of the LM
test is that there is no serial correlation up to a lag order k where k is a pre-
speciﬁed integer. The LM test statistic is asymptotically distributed as , a chi- 2 k
squared test statistic with k degrees of freedom. There is no evidence of
autocorrelation using orders for k as high as 5.
 Empirical Results
Estimates of the consumption wealth effects from Equation (9) are in Exhibit 4.
The ﬁrst two columns report results when variables are normalized by personal
disposable income. Columns (3) and (4) are when variables are normalized by
human capital income. Parameter estimates are for the marginal propensities to
consume from real estate and ﬁnancial wealth. Estimates signiﬁcant at the 1%
level one-tailed are in boldface type.
In Column (1) of Exhibit 4 are estimates of the marginal propensity to consume
from wealth when variables are normalized by personal disposable income. The
marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth is 0.150 of an additional
dollar of housing wealth, signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The marginal propensity to
consume from this additional dollar of ﬁnancial wealth is 0.02 and is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. A Wald test on the difference between the two coefﬁcientsWhy Households Concentrate Wealth in Housing  337
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Exhibit 3  Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Unit Root
Series Trend Augmented Lags Test Statistics 95% Critical Value
ct Yes 4 v1  3.04, 1.85 3.43
ht No 4 v2  1.73, 1.43 2.88
st Yes 4 v1  1.54, 1.50 3.43

ct No 3 v2  8.27, 8.01 2.88

ht No 3 v2  5.19, 5.45 2.88

































Unit Root Test 1 2.26, 2.56 3.96
Notes:
Unit Root. The estimating equation is 




 x   .  rt rt
j1
the ﬁrst difference operator, r is the number of augmentation lags, (, , ) are parameters and t
is a disturbance. The unit root test is for   1 against   1. If the time series appear to have a
trend, time t is included with test statistic v1. Otherwise, time is excluded with test statistic v2. The
number of augmentation lags r is large enough to eliminate evidence of serial correlation in the
residuals from the estimating equations. Asymptotic critical values are used, since the residuals
from the estimating regressions do not appear to be normally distributed.
Cointegration. The lag length m involves sequential likelihood ratio tests and the Akaike
information criterion. Both involve m  5 including of a drift in the trend component of zt. The
Johansen (1995) test determines the number of cointegrating relationships as the rank of  in

zt  z  zt1  m
z Test statistics are for 
trace and 
max the trace and largest
m
  .  tmz t
j1
eigenvalue of . An alternative is a unit root test for e  1 for a unit root against the stationary
alternative e  1i n
et  (e  1)e with parameters (e, ) and
k
 
 e    t1 kt ke t
j1
disturbance et.338  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
Exhibit 4  Marginal Propensities to Consume From Wealth: 1952:4–2002:2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Personal Disposable Income Human Capital Income
Estimate t-Statistic Estimate t-Statistic
Constant 0.00 1.31 0.001 1.51

s1 Financial S 0.020 3.67 0.028 4.76

h1 Housing H 0.150 5.31 0.209 7.29
AR(1) 0.285 0.303
Adj. R2 0.256 0.42
LM Test 1.26 0.04
Note: N  199.
indicates whether or not housing and ﬁnancial wealth can be aggregated: the
resulting computed F-Statistic is 20.15, signiﬁcant at the 5% level, demonstrating
that the marginal propensity to consume from housing exceeds that for ﬁnancial
assets.
The human capital income measure underlying the coefﬁcient estimates appears
in Column (3) of Exhibit 4. The marginal propensity to consume from an
additional dollar of housing wealth is 0.209, while that from ﬁnancial wealth is
0.028. Both coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The Wald test
indicates that the difference between the two is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, with a computed F-Statistic of 37.51.
The results can be compared with alternative estimates of the marginal propensity
to consume from real estate and ﬁnancial wealth. Using PSID data, Engelhardt
(1996) ﬁnds that housing wealth can have a large though asymmetric impact on
consumption. Households reduce consumption by as much as 30 cents for a one
dollar decline in house equity. When house equity increases, the impact on
consumption is negligible. For ﬁnancial assets, the estimate of a low marginal
propensity to consume is consistent with Poterba and Samwick (1995).6 They
examine luxury good demand when stock prices rise, and their results ﬁnd
sensitivity only in the automobile market, leading Shleifer (1995) to suggest that
the marginal propensity to consume from stock market wealth is negligible.
Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001) present estimates of the marginal propensity to
consume from housing wealth from two data sets. One data set for the U.S.
involves cross-sectional state retail sales data as the consumption deﬁnition. Their
measure of housing wealth is based on the repeat-sales price index from the Ofﬁce
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). In their cross-sectional U.S.Why Households Concentrate Wealth in Housing  339
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state regressions, the elasticity of consumption with respect to housing wealth
ranges from 0.05 to 0.09. For housing wealth of $100, a $1 increase in house
prices (with mortgage debt constant) results in a consumption increase of 5 cents
to 9 cents in the current year.
Their second set of results is for 14 countries for 1975 to 1999. These results are
based on time-series regressions of aggregate consumption of housing and
ﬁnancial wealth. The difference for this second set of results is that aggregate
consumption is the dependent variable. The elasticity of consumption with respect
to housing wealth ranges between 0.11 and 0.17. For an initial $100 in housing
wealth, a $1 increase in house value raises consumption in the current year
between 11 and 17 cents. As shown in Exhibit 4, our measures of total
consumption with time-series data are similar. The estimates in the exhibit show
that the marginal propensity to consume is between 15 and 20 cents a year,
consistent with the results of the international data used by Case, Quigley and
Shiller (2001).
For the marginal propensity to consume from ﬁnancial wealth, the cross-sectional
aggregate consumption data yields results similar to Case, Quigley, and Shiller
(2001). In their international comparisons, they ﬁnd that the marginal propensity
to consume from ﬁnancial wealth is between zero and 2 cents. That estimate of
zero to 2 cents is similar to the estimates in this study of 2 to 3 cents for the
marginal propensity to consume from ﬁnancial wealth obtained in Exhibit 4, with
comparable time series data on aggregate consumption.
For the marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth, there is a difference
when using U.S. state retail sales as compared with time series and aggregate
consumption. Spending at the state retail level amounts to only about 50% of total
consumption spending as measured in the National Income and Product Accounts
(NIPA) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
For example, in 2001, NIPA consumption spending totaled $7.1 trillion on an
annualized basis, while state retail sales for 2001 were estimated at $3.5 trillion,
slightly less than half of total consumption. Case, Quigley and Shiller (2001) use
only state retail sales data in their estimate of U.S. housing and ﬁnancial wealth
consumption (their retail sales data for the 50 states is from 1982:1 to 1999:4).
Retail sales include items such as food and clothing with low income and wealth
elasticities. If retail sales are less wealth-elastic than all consumption, Case,
Quigley and Shiller’s (2001) estimate will be understated as a marginal propensity
to consume.
Returning to the larger data set, the sample mean among households from the
1998 SCF is that 74% of total wealth is held in ﬁnancial assets and 26% in real
estate. Using these weights and the national accounts deﬁnition of personal
disposable income, the overall marginal propensity to consume from wealth is 5.4
cents per dollar. On the other hand, using the Davis and Palumbo (2001) deﬁnition
of income from human capital, or personal disposable income less property
income, the marginal propensity is 7.5 cents annually per dollar. These estimates340  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
are within the Poterba (2000) bound for the marginal propensity to consume from
aggregate wealth. These bounds (for plausible estimates of the long-term rate,
time horizon and risk aversion) are between 2 and 10 cents per dollar per year.
The estimates of Exhibit 4 have maximum likelihood properties, allowing for the
solution of Equation (8) that generate the weighting factor and the required risk
premium.
The estimation from the disaggregated consumption function yields marginal
propensities to consume for each type of asset, ﬁnancial wealth and housing.
Given a speciﬁcation of the aggregate utility function, here exhibiting constant
relative risk aversion and the economic environment of long rate and horizon, the
implicit return to holding housing can be obtained.
The estimation derives estimates of the marginal propensity to consume from
ﬁnancial wealth s and housing wealth h. The environment provides parameters
for the long-term interest rate , the horizon  t and the coefﬁcient of relative 
risk aversion Once these three parameters are speciﬁed, then the discount rate .
can be derived as .
Using hats to denote estimates, the marginal propensity to consume from housing
wealth is  The marginal propensity to consume from ﬁnancial wealth ˆˆ ˆ   . hh
is analogous. The marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth is equal
to the marginal propensity to consume from all wealth multiplied by a shift factor
that may vary across assets. Substituting for the discounted weighting factors from
Equations (4) and (5), the marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth
is  Here  is the weighting factor that
1
ˆ  1   11   ˆˆ ˆ  .     hh h t ˆˆ 1   1   1  h
depends on the long-term interest rate and implicitly on the real discount rate for
ﬁnancial wealth The weighting factor solves  1  t ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ  .     hh h h h
is the overall marginal propensity to consume, with liquidity ˆˆ ˆ  where  h
adjustment for housing and a speciﬁed time horizon, set at 10 years. ˆ h
This is a quadratic equation, and the most feasible solution is for ˆ   0.996 h
housing. With a long rate of of of 10%, and a coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion 
for  of 0.4, all the parameters are in place to derive the implied return  ˆ h
 1 Substituting,  0.9964. Also (1  0.9444. The
1  1 ˆ  ) h  1 ˆ  (1  ) h
product of these two is (1  0.9429. The last step is to derive as  1 ˆˆ  )  hh
the inverse, less one. The calculation results in  0.0606. ˆ h
The real rate of discount applied to holding housing is therefore 6.06%. This
discount rate is a premium, based on the long-term interest rate, the time horizon
of the representative household and its coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. From
estimates of the marginal propensity to consume from housing, the underlying
rate of return to housing for the aggregate economy is derived.Why Households Concentrate Wealth in Housing  341
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 Conclusion
Households concentrate their holdings of wealth in housing and show a higher
marginal propensity to consume housing wealth. That higher marginal propensity
may be because housing provides both consumption and investment. Financial
assets do not provide direct consumption; rather, a dominant part of total
consumption is from housing wealth.
The marginal propensity to consume from housing ranges between 15 cents and
20 cents per dollar of wealth per additional dollar of wealth. The results are based
on time series and aggregate data for the U.S. economy for consumption, ﬁnancial
wealth and housing wealth. Using data from fourteen countries, Case, Quigley
and Shiller (2001) ﬁnd marginal propensity to consume from housing wealth
ranges between 11 and 17 cents per dollar (in the current year), consistent with
the estimates obtained here.
Part of the difference in marginal propensities to consume between ﬁnancial and
housing wealth is likely to lie in the consumption aspect of each. Housing is
consumed and ﬁnancial wealth is not. The consumption of housing is included in
aggregate consumption; its weight in the Consumer Price Index, itself based on
cross-sectional data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey for the U.S., is more
than 40%. Netting out the consumption of housing from total consumption will
determine the extent to which housing wealth funds non-housing consumption.
With the ability to borrow and reﬁnance against housing on a non-recourse basis
and at rates tied to federal debt, households have used their homes to fund
consumption.
The consumption model describes the behavior of a representative household over
its planning horizon. Standard assumptions are made about household utility. After
applying liquidity adjustments to each asset, comparable cash equivalent values
are obtained for each form of wealth. The implied marginal propensities to
consume from each form of wealth differ and depend on risk preferences, time
horizons and long-term interest rates. Using a non-linear estimating equation, the
hypothesis that the marginal propensities to consume from physical and ﬁnancial
wealth are identical is tested. The resulting computed F-Statistic is 20.15, which
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, demonstrating that the marginal propensity to
consume from housing exceeds that for ﬁnancial assets.
 Endnotes
1 See, for example, Davis and Palumbo (2001).
2 In the long run over generations, the marginal propensity to consume from all three
forms of wealth should be similar, but in the shorter time span of an individual, a
household’s consumption may be impacted by the constraints associated with consuming
a particular form of wealth. The three forms of wealth (human, physical and ﬁnancial)342  Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud
are assumed to have different liquidity risks and the marginal propensity to consume
from each asset also depends on risk preferences.
3 Households have increasingly used mortgage equity withdrawals to access housing wealth
to fund consumption. Methods households have used include cashing out some equity
when reﬁnancing mortgages, home equity lines and withdrawing housing wealth when
selling homes and not fully reinvesting the housing wealth in a new home as in Canner,
Dynan and Passmore (2002).
4 Households may also use margin debt to access ﬁnancial equity without paying taxes,
but margin debt is callable unlike most residential mortgages including equity lines of
credit.
5 To estimate the marginal propensities to consume from housing and ﬁnancial wealth,
aggregate U.S. data that more fully measures total consumption spending than micro data
such as when state retail is employed. Although aggregation biases exist when grouped
household data are used such as potentially exaggerated household consumption
elasticities, micro data such, as that from the American Housing Survey is subject to
many biases such as self-reporting inaccuracies. Further, use of aggregate data allows for
a consistent 50-year time-series allowing for greater analysis of the housing concentration
issue.
6 Ludvigson (1998) shows that credit for automobile loans may act to restrain consumption
during periods of tight money supply.
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